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Notre Europe is an independent research and policy unit whose objective is the study of 
Europe  – its history and civilisations, integration process and future prospects. The 
association was founded by Jacques Delors in the autumn of 1996. It has a small team of in-
house researchers from various countries. 
 
Notre Europe participates in public debate in two ways. First, publishing internal research 
papers and second, collaborating with outside researchers and academics to contribute to the 
debate on European issues. These documents are made available to a limited number of 
decision-makers, politicians, socio-economists, academics and diplomats in the various EU 
Member States, but are systematically put on our website. 
 
The association also organises meetings, conferences and seminars in association with other 
institutions or partners. Proceedings are written in order to disseminate the main arguments 
raised during the event. 
 
 
Sciences Po, Paris 
 
Sciences Po is the  name given to the grouping of the ‘Fondation nationale des sciences 
politiques’ and the ‘Institut d’études politiques’ of Paris, a higher education establishment. If 
we add the researchers of  FNSP and those of  ‘CNRS’, as well as the staff of  ‘Education 
nationale’ and those receiving state grants for research, Sciences Po comprises more than 200 
temporary and professional researchers. In quantitative terms, this amounts to considerable 
potential, and makes Sciences Po one of the most important institutions i n social science 
research in France. Europe occupies a significant role in the activities of several of its 
research centres.  
 
 
European University Institute, Florence 
 
The European University Institute was founded in 1972 by the European Community Member 
States. Its main objective is to provide advanced academic training to PhD students and to 
promote research at the highest level. It carries out research in a European perspective 
(fundamental research, comparative research and Community research) in history, law, 
economics, political and social science. Its full-time teaching staff and 330 research students 
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Since 1999, Europe has been experiencing a period of electoral turmoil, mainly 
characterised by the emergence of populist movements led by somewhat offbeat characters: 
Jörg Haider's FPÖ, Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National, the Pim Fortuyn List, etc. While 
recent polls have prompted much comment and passionate debate, an important aspect of the 
phenomenon has been ignored. What lessons can be drawn at European level from the rising 
protest vote in many countries of the Union? And are there any direct  or indirect links 
between these national shocks and the European integration process? 
 
The question is worth asking, at a time when the European Union is preparing to 
complete a historic enlargement process and is in the midst of a debate on its institutional 
architecture which will necessarily require it to reflect on its relationship with citizens. 
 
However, we should not underestimate the complexity of the matter. It is hard enough 
to determine what lessons the European elections hold for the Union. Given the lack of clear 
European issues, these are often no more than life-size surveys of the popularity of the 
governments in power. We must therefore be all the more cautious when looking at national 
polls, where European affairs have generally been brushed under the carpet. 
 
While initial analyses have focused on political supply (populist movements and their 
charismatic leaders), our aim, within the framework of this exercise, was to examine the 




Rise in populism or crisis of representative democracy? 
 
One initial point is clear. Populist movements have not gained a foothold everywhere. 
The United Kingdom has been spared, as has Germany, where the far right (whose advances 
in certain local elections had prompted a degree of concern) lost ground in the latest  
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legislative polls. However, fairly widespread distrust of politics can undoubtedly be noted 
throughout Europe. 
 
There is no shortage of symptoms, as can be seen from the sheets below. Voter turnout 
is dropping everywhere. In France, it barely reached 71.6% in the first round of the 
presidential elections (a decrease of almost 7% compared with 1995). And only 64.4% of 
voters bothered to turn out for the legislative elections (3.5% less than 1997), despite having 
mobilised in large numbers for the second round of the presidential elections. Voter volatility 
has also increased. In the polls of June 2002, 30.7% of Dutch voters changed camp compared 
with the previous elections. Volatility is also reflected in the emergence of new parties, that 
are sometimes short-lived and often focused on a single cause (the pensioners' party in the 
Netherlands, the hunters of Chasse, pêche, nature et tradition in France, etc.). 
 
And there are other patent signs of disaffection with politics beyond the elections 
themselves. Political activism is waning – and the decline is perceptible even in the United 
Kingdom, although a high number of people there claim to be happy with the way democracy 
is working. Confidence in political parties has also faded: 82% of persons surveyed in France 
believe that politicians are not concerned about citizens' welfare. By way of comparison, this 
indicator of distrust stands at "only" 68% in Slovakia (the accession candidate often said to 
have the most worrying political system). And it seems that, in many countries, the 
confidence crisis is affecting not just the parties but all representative organisations, including 
trade unions. 
 
Hence this first conclusion: at European level, the most worrying factor in the latest 
electoral polls is not so much the rise in populism (which is undeniable, although of varying 
significance from one country to the next) as the crisis in representative democracy (which 
does, for its part, seem to be affecting most European countries). It is also notable that the 
confidence crisis seems deeper in "consociative" systems (where parties of diverse political 
persuasions are t raditionally involved in policy-making). Populist movements have 
materialised in Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and now the Netherlands, but seem to have 
more difficulty emerging in countries that feature sharper transitions between left and right. 
That is certainly not a question of chance: consociativism, a system based on consensus 
among an elite, is an easy target for populist accusations of power-stealing by an upper caste  
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and also makes changes more difficult to achieve. In such a context, the temptation of a 
protest vote (whether left- or right-wing) is naturally strong. 
 
We should beware, however, of concluding that the crisis of representative democracy 
necessarily amounts to a crisis of democracy itself. It is possible to criticise a political system 
without being against democracy. In Germany, the most vocal critics of the political system 
are the Green voters, who can hardly be regarded as advocates of authoritarian regimes. On 
the contrary, the disenchantment with representative democracy is coinciding with the rise of 
new forms of activism based on direct democracy. A multiplicity of non-governmental 
organisations are emerging throughout Europe. Even in the United Kingdom, the cradle of 
parliamentary democracy, new forms of activism and involvement are making their mark 
outside the parliamentary framework. 
 
The recent electoral shocks have therefore taken place in the context of a paradigm 
shift. In Europe, as elsewhere, the democratic ideal is no longer restricted to traditional forms 
of representative democracy. That is probably a factor whose consequences will also need to 
be considered in the debate on how to organise the Europe of the future. 
 
 
What about Europe? 
 
As regards the European side of things, two points are worth highlighting. 
 
The p artisans of protest movements are frequently hostile towards the European 
integration process, even though it is not one of their primary concerns. In France, for 
instance, far-right voters are the only ones who are predominantly against Europe. But the 
strongest opponents of the Union remain the leaders of these movements. The diatribes of 
people such as Bossi and Haider are still ringing in many ears. They had all the more impact 
since moderate parties are often remarkably coy about European issues, almost as if they had 
something to hide… However, we must also make allowances for political opportunism: there 
was a time when Italy's Lega Nord was complaining that the "Mezzogiorno millstone" could 
prevent it from joining the federalist hard core suggested by Karl Lamers and Wolfgang 
Schaüble. Furthermore, the most virulent Europhobia is to be found in the United Kingdom,  
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where populist movements have not really managed to gain much support. So populism 
cannot be said to equate with Euroscepticism. 
 
Nonetheless, the studies conducted as part of our exercise reveal several signs of 
convergence between the two phenomena. Those who vote for populist movements typically 
tend to be worried about their future, perceived as bleak, and alarmed at the prospect of a 
decline in the welfare State. They feel their identity is threatened, and are therefore hostile 
towards immigration. They are frustrated at political leaders' lack of concern for their 
problems – hence their support for people who dare to say no (in particular if these do so in 
strident tones). These fears partly overlap with those of the Eurosceptics, who generally 
deplore the undermining of traditional society and defend an ethnocentric view of society. 
 
While the European Union is not the primary cause of these fears, it can fuel them in 
several ways. The preoccupations of the populist electorate can be encapsulated in one word: 
insecurity. Yet the Union does not appear to be particularly concerned about security issues. 
On the other hand, the Union's emphasis on trade liberalisation is worrying those who feel 
they have been left by the wayside in the drive towards modernisation; efforts to achieve free 
movement are stirring up fears of the Union becoming a sieve for migrants; and the Union is 
sometimes perceived as a hindrance preventing governments from providing an appropriate 
security response. Lastly, the workings of the European Union – largely based on seeking 
compromises among national elites – do not really allow citizens to make their voice heard. 
 
In other words, while European integration is not a direct cause of the protest vote, it 
can clearly become a factor in strengthening it. 
 
 
What can be done? 
 
We should first understand that the protest vote is only the tip of the iceberg – the 
eruptive manifestation of a diffuse malaise within the societal body. Those who voted for Le 
Pen, Bossi or Haider are not the only ones worried about immigration, just as those who voted 
for Arlette Laguiller or Oliver Besancenot are not the only ones concerned about the future of 
the welfare State. To respond to their fears is to respond to the concerns of much vaster 
swathes of public opinion.  
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But how? 
 
We will limit ourselves to outlining two areas for further debate – one substantive, the 
other procedural – that are broadly based on ongoing research at Notre Europe. 
 
As we have pointed out, the protest vote generally reflects a diffuse desire for security. 
The underlying preoccupations extend far beyond protection against assault and robbery. 
Social insecurity, loss of identity, concern about the quality of the environment and food are 
other important considerations at stake. In a rapidly changing world, there is strong demand 
for security. 
 
Not all these areas are directly relevant to the European Union, but many h ave 
significant European aspects. And the Union is often viewed with suspicion in this context, 
for it was built primarily as a market. 
 
Hence a very simple premise: only by adopting and displaying far-reaching ambitions 
in all these areas, including with respect to immigration, can the Union allay these fears. It 
must aim to establish an area of security for citizens worried at the rapid pace of change in 
modern society. 
 
This is not purely a matter of political expediency. There has always been a close 
correlation between the legitimacy of political institutions and their ability to safeguard the 
security of the people under their authority. The nation-States established themselves as 
guarantors of security. The Union, which now exercises a significant proportion of their 
authority, cannot ignore the obligations this entails. 
 
Furthermore, as regards procedures, the feeling of alienation demonstrated by the 
protest vote must be addressed. Quite obviously, the root causes of the phenomenon are to be 
found at national level. But the Union, which impacts on the life of these citizens in so many 
ways, must also be taken into account. Decision-making at European level is notoriously 
difficult for the general public to understand, let alone influence. In addition to the task of 
simplification, the European Convention should therefore also examine how citizens can be 
allowed to make their voice heard.  
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This debate should take account of the lessons of the latest electoral polls. All too 
often, the debates on the reform of the European institutions are based on national models. 
Yet the outbursts of protest voting in recent years have shown the limitation of these models. 
We always seem to turn to parliaments – at both national and European level – for the extra 
dose of legitimacy the Union needs. If representative democracy is in crisis at national level, 
would it not be unwise to expect too much of it at European level (where, apart from anything 
else, its implementation is fraught with structural difficulties)? 
 
On the other hand, anything that is likely to allow citizens to influence policy-making 
by the Union is worth looking at closely: whether dialogue with civil society – which is still 
lacking a specific framework – or the possibility of European referendums (although perhaps 
on specific decisions rather than on treaty reform). Above all, we must reiterate an obvious 
fact: the simplest way to restore the general public's interest in public affairs is to allow it to 
have a direct influence on the appointment of its leaders. That is true at both national and 
local level. Why should the Union be any different? Yet this issue can hardly be said to have 
received the attention it deserves in the current discussions. There has been a lot of talk about 
leadership and institutional balance. It would probably also be useful to look into how a direct 
link can be established between voter preferences and the nomination of those who will, in 
future, be at the helm of the Union, in whatever capacity. 
 
Let us repeat that these are merely avenues which should be explored. At this stage, 
our purpose is not to defend the merits of a particular system but to insist on the need, in 
discussions on the tasks of the Union and its institutional architecture, to respond to the 
concerns that have led to the manifestations of protest seen in recent years. Should the 
Convention come up with no more than cosmetic changes, there is a strong probability that 
the disaffection movements already observed will continue to grow. 
  




Political Disenchantment and Populist Mobilisation in Austria and Switzerland 
Hans-Georg Betz, Department of Political Science, University of Geneva 
 
 
There are undoubtedly few cases among contemporary Western democracies, which have 
seen as pronounced an eruption of popular disenchantment with politics and more signs of 
democratic distemper than Austria and Switzerland during the past decade. This is particularly 
remarkable given the fact that the two countries have generally been regarded by political 
scientists and pundits alike as highly stable and successful examples of consociationalism and 
neocorporatism. In addition, the two countries are not only among the most affluent capitalist 
democracies in the world, but both also have traditionally had significantly lower rates of 
unemployment than their larger neighbours, and, last but not least, both boast a relatively 
extensive system of social security and public welfare. 
Despite these achievements, both countries have experienced a dramatic rise in popular 
political disenchantment, reflected not only in a marked decline in electoral participation rates 
and falling support for the traditional parties, but also in a spectacular increase in support for 
right-wing populist parties and their charismatic leaders. 
In  Austria, the rise of right-wing populism is closely connected to the flamboyant leader of 
the Freedom Party, Jörg Haider, who, within the span of only a few years, transformed 
Austria’s third party into a serious contender for political power. For most of  the postwar 
period, the Freedom Party gained little more than five percent of the vote. In the mid-1980s, it 
was threatened with political extinction. Since Haider took over the chair of the party, the 
FPO’s fortunes experienced a dramatic turnaround. 9.7 percent in the national election of 
1986 was followed by 16.6. percent in 1990, 22.5 percent in 1994, and, after a momentary 
decline in the 1995 election, 26.9 percent in 1999, resulting in the FPO’s inclusion in a 
coalition government with the Austrian People’s Party. 
Haider’s rise has to be seen in a larger context of political instability and voter 
disenchantment.  This was reflected in a significant decline in electoral participation as well 
as a rather dramatic decline in support for the two major Austrian parties, which for most of 
the postwar period had divided political power among themselves (via the famous Proportz 
system). From 1945 to the early 1980s, Austria boasted some of the highest electoral 
participation rates in Western Europe, ranging between 97 percent in 1949 and 92 percent in 
1970. However, the rise of Haider’s FPO also marked the beginning of a secular decline in 
electoral participation. After still reaching 91 percent in 1986, electoral participation declined 
to 82 percent in 1994 and, after a brief rebound in 1995, to 80 percent in 1999. A similar trend 
can be seen with regard to support for the two major parties as a share of the electorate (i.e., 
all eligible voters). Whereas in 1971, their share amounted to 85 percent, by 1990, it  had 
declined to 63 percent. In the 1999 election, it had fallen to 47 percent.  Clearly, at the turn of 
the millennium, a majority of the Austrian electorate no longer saw themselves represented by 
the two major parties, with a growing number of them either voting for the anti-system (i.e., 
anti-Proportz) or opting out of the institutional arrangements of formal democracy altogether.  
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Developments in Switzerland have followed a similar pattern, albeit less dramatic. In 
Switzerland, democratic distemper is closely associated with the rise of Christoph Blocher, 
the leader of the Zurich branch of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC). For most of the 
postwar period a ten-percent party, which represented the interests of the rural constituencies 
in the German parts of Switzerland, the SVP made its dramatic gains only during the past five 
years. In 1991, it still garnered less than 12 percent of the vote; by 1999, it attained 22.5 
percent of the vote, which turned it into Switzerland’s largest party, whose support base 
increasingly extended beyond its traditional strongholds in the German parts of Switzerland. 
In fact, in 1999, for the first time, the SVP made major gains in parts of Suisse Romande. 
Among the main reasons for the party’s success was its leader’s carefully cultivated image as 
a “Neinsager,” a principled opponent of the “political class,” and this despite the fact that the 
SVP is one of the four parties that permanently make up the Swiss federal government; his 
vocal opposition to Switzerland’s participation in the process of European integration; and his 
equally vocal defense of Switzerland’s reputation in the wake of revelations about the Swiss 
role during the Second World War. Significantly enough, the gains of the SVP in the 1999 
election came to an extent at the expense of the former Automobile Party, which in the early 
1990s, with a mixture of right-wing libertarianism and xenophobia, had made significant 
gains on the national and cantonal level. As a result, the only other significant populist party 
in Switzerland that has resisted the SVP’s onslaught has been the Lega dei Ticinesi, which, 
however, plays only a role in the Italian speaking canton of Ticino. 
Like in Austria, the rise of Blocher has to be seen in a larger context of declining popular 
political participation and falling support for the four main political parties (including, of 
course, the SVP). However, the importance of electoral participation in Switzerland is 
difficult to evaluate. Switzerland has traditionally had one of the lowest participation rates 
among advanced democracies, owing to several factors, not least the country’s system of 
direct democracy. On the face of it, Switzerland’s participation rates have been abysmally 
low. The decline started in the 1970s, when for the first  time participation fell below 60 
percent and continued in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1979, participation fell below 50 percent. It 
reached an all-time low of 42 percent in 1995, only to recover slightly in 1999, by one 
percent. In recent years, participation rates have been particularly low in Suisse Romande, 
reaching as low as 32 percent in Vaud, 34 percent in Neuchatel, and 36 percent in Geneve, 
and reached even in Schaffhausen only 62 percent, despite the fact that Schaffhausen imposes 
a fine on those who don’t vote (the fine, however, is only 3 Franken). Concomitantly with the 
decline in participation, Switzerland also witnessed a sharp fall in support for the four major 
parties, from 56 percent of the electorate in 1959 to 31 percent in 1999. Interestingly enough, 
in Switzerland, “opposition parties” benefited little from this decline. Their share of the vote 
remained fairly stable around 13 percent of the vote. 
This situation might change in the future. Until now, the SVP has remained part of the grand 
coalition that makes up the federal government. However, under Blocher, the party has often 
been in opposition to the other members of the government, thus appealing to widespread 
popular resentment with the dominant parties. The extent of resentment was reflected once 
again during the recent referendum on the so-called gold initiative, where the majority of 
voters rejected both the official position of the government and the position of the SVP. It is 
too early to tell what will be the impact of this and other defeats in referenda (another 
important defeat was the positive result of the UN referendum) on the electoral fortunes of the 
SVP in the upcoming national elections in the coming year. 
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Discontent and the success of the populist right in Flanders and Belgium 
Mark Elchardus, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 
 
 
Like many other western democracies Belgium has witnessed high levels of discontent, as 
well as the decline of trust in institutions, rising dissatisfaction with politics and the success of 
the extreme or populist right. In this note I shall focus on Flanders. The Dutch and French 
speaking parts of Belgium are largely distinct political systems with different (albeit still 
symmetrical) political parties.  
 
Electoral participation 
Due to compulsory voting (the obligation to present oneself at the voting booth) discontent 
has not as clearly as in other countries expressed itself in declining political participation. 
Absenteeism rose from 6.4% of the electorate in 1985 to 9.4% in 1999. The percentage of 
invalid and blank votes was 7.5% in 1985 and 6.6% in 1999.  
In surveys of the end of the nineties (1998-2000) about a quarter of the electorate states that it 
would not participate in elections if it weren’t for the existing compulsion.  
 
Discontent 
Within the Flemish electorate discontent has reached high levels in the nineties (trustworthy 
data to investigate the long-term development are not available).  
Two good indicators are the ‘expectations for the future’ and the ‘feelings of (in)security’.  
About a quarter of the population holds a pessimistic outlook on the future; more than half 
expects rising inequality and exclusion in the future, as well as the pending insufficiency of 
the public pension system. About 75 to 80% of the people polled, express the conviction that 
security has declined and the risk of victimisation increased. About one in two thinks that the 
police are no longer able to protect them against (rising) crime.  
While the future outlook became somewhat more optimistic between 1997 and 2000, the level 
of perceived insecurity remains high and is relatively stable.  
 
Trust in institutions 
The trust in institutions can be reliably documented in 1980, 1990 and by way of 8 different 
surveys for the period 1995 tot 2001. There is a general decline in trust in institutions (or 
societal trust) between 1980 and 1990. There are signs of a bottoming out of the decline 
around 1995 but then again a further decline during the Dutroux-crisis (1996-1997). Trust re-
establishes itself somewhat from 1998 on, although in 1999 societal trust is still lower in 
Belgium than in Italy, France, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and 
Ireland (using data from the European Values Studies). Data from 2000 and 2001 indicate that 
trust continues to rise, but that distrust in institutions, especially political institutions is still 
very high. 
For the period 1995 to 2000, the trust in about 20 institutions, as reported by 9500 
respondents, can be compared. In general the lack of trust is highest for institutions with a  
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representative function (parties, parliament, unions, lawyers, the church). Among the 
representative institutions the specifically political ones are hardest hit. Trust is also relatively 
low in institutions that deal with the articulation of interests (parties, unions, and press) and 
the resolution of conflicts (lawyers, justice). As a matter of fact, institutions involved in 
crucial functions of the democratic state of law  – representation, interest articulation and 
conflict resolution- are distrusted. Relatively more trust is placed in authoritative institutions 
that, in the mind of the citizens, are elevated above divisiveness and conflict (medicine, 
science, education, hospitals, and the king).  
The distrustful citizen is not a “new”, more vocal, critical, involved and informed citizen. The 
contrary is true. Lack of trust in institutions is more prevalent among people with low degrees 
of social participation, low degrees of involvement in their immediate surrounding, low 
degrees of interest in politics and societal topics in general. 
 
Membership of political parties 
Over the last 20 years political parties have lost members. Yet the loss was less pronounced 
than in other western societies (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001). If we leave Spain, Greece and 
Portugal aside, party membership declined with 38% in European democracies, and with 22% 
in Belgium. 
Membership in the conservative liberal party (VLD), as well as in the new parties, Greens 
(AGALEV) and populist right (Vlaams Blok) rose during that period.  
 
The electoral expression of discontent 
Discontent has expressed itself electorally in two ways. On the one hand through the success 
of parties that can be described as protest parties and that are characterised by a populist, anti-
establishment style, more than by a program. Even when relatively successful in the elections, 
these formations tend to quickly disintegrate. 
The other and far more important expression of political disenchantment is the rise of the 
extreme right or populist right wing Vlaams Blok. Founded in 1978 the party obtained 1.4% 
of the votes in that year’s parliamentary elections. Two decades later, in 1999, it obtained 
15.4% of the vote in Flanders and about one out of three votes in the city of Antwerp. In the 
polls (elections are due in June 2003, but could take place earlier) the party is now estim ated 
to obtain 17% of the  vote (such estimates have, of course, to be treated with caution).  
The origin of the Vlaams Blok can be situated in Flemish nationalism, with quite a few of the 
present core members and leaders coming from families that were active in fascist parties in 
the thirties and collaborated with the German occupational forces during the second World 
War. The success of the party is however not due so much to its nationalism as to its stand on 
immigration and crime. Its electorate attaches great importance to these issues, is in favour of 
hard repression of crime and against the growing ethnic and cultural diversity of their society.  
The big breakthrough of the Vlaams Blok occurred in 1991, when it jumped from 3 to more 
than 10%. It’s gain in that election was largely realised to the detriment of the socialist party, 
which lost many of its traditional (working class, less educated) voters to the Vlaams Blok. 
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Explaining the success of the populist right  
The different developments mentioned - disenchantment, decline of trust, rise of the populist 
right - are closely interconnected, and their interconnectedness can in part explain the success 
of the right wing party.  
People with a dim view of the future also tend to feel very insecure. Both variables can be 
used as closely interconnected indicators of discontent (or unease, or lack of well being). The 
pessimistic outlook on the future and the feelings of insecurity, translate themselves in an 
ideology that carries a particular view of the nature of man and of the conditions of social 
order. Man is viewed as an individual that will only pursue it’s self-interest, and that can only 
be disciplined through self-interest or threat. Values and principles are seen as window 
dressing, used to better pursue one’s interests. This conception of human nature is translated 
into distrust towards representatives (who only pursue their personal interest) and scepticism 
toward representative democracy, as well as feeling of powerlessness, and a preference for 
harsh repression of deviant behaviour. It is also linked to resistance against the multi-cultural 
or multi-ethnic society. Minority groups are considered “migrants”, associated with crime and 
backwardness and perceived as a threat tot the social security system. These different attitudes 
(utilitarian individualism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, feelings of political powerlessness, 
preference for harsh repression of crime, scepticism towards representative democracy, and 
antipolitical feelings) are close interrelated. They are part of an alignment of attitudes and 
convictions
1. This alignment is furthermore embedded in subcultures and taste cultures, 
solidifying into a societal cleavage. The right wing position on this cleavage is strongly 
associated with a vote for the Vlaams Blok; the left wing position with a vote for the green 
party.  
A pessimistic view of the future, feelings of insecurity and the attitudes associated with the 
rightist position on the described cleavage, increase the likelihood that someone will place 
little trust in the institutions of one’s society. It seems obvious that people don’t trust the 
institutions of a society that does not guarantee them a future or give them a basic feeling of 
security. The relationship between the non or anti democratic values and the lack of trust, can 
possibly be explained by the fact that most people holding those attitudes do know that the 
elites, representing the institutions, do condemn them and consider them morally inferior.  
Using survey data gathered in 1998, the intention to vote for the Vlaams Blok can to a quite 
significant degree be explained by the position on the cleavage and the trust in institutions. 
Both the position on the cleavage and the degree of trust in institutions are in turn very 
strongly influenced by the expectations with regard to the future and the feelings of 
(in)security. To an important degree explaining the rise of the populist right comes down to 
explaining the rising feelings of insecurity and pessimism with regard to the future, and the 
translation of these feelings in a particular view of the motives of people and the conditions of 
social order.   
While there is serious empirical support for the thesis that the success of the populist right in 
Flanders can to a large degree be explained by these factors, there is no reason to assume that 
the conducive factors are not present in the French speaking part of the country as well. Yet, 
the populist right is much less successful there. The success of the populist right is clearly a 
question of supply and demand. Even if the conditions are fertile, there has to be a believable 
party or movement, and/or charismatic leader(s). The right wing movement in Flanders can 
dispose of both leaders, able to act strategically, and a substratum of nationalist organisations 
on which it was able to build an effective and disciplined party. These conditions seem to be 
                                                                 
1 Akin to, yet different from Lipset’s “working class authoritarianism” and Middendorp’s “cultural 
conservatism”.   
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lacking, until now, in the French speaking part of the country. There are also important 
differences in the reactions of the other parties to the threat of populism and the 
manifestations of dissatisfaction between the two linguistic communities.  
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Denmark: A landslide to the right by trustful voters 
Jørgen Goul Andersen, Aalborg University 
 
 
The Danish election on Nov.20, 2001 brought a landslide to the right. The moderate and 
‘extreme’ right  - the Conservatives, Liberals, and two right-wing populist parties got a 
combined share of the vote of 52.9 per cent, which was the highest figure since 1920. The 
populist right - The Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party - got a combined vote of 
12.6 pct.. The huge majority of these votes - 12.0 per cent - were cast on The Danish People’s 
party, formed in 1995 as a splinter from the Progress Party (but headed by its former leader, 
Mrs. Pia Kjaersgaard). 
From 1990 to 2001, the ‘extreme right’ doubled its support among Danish voters. However, 
the Progress Party, formed in 1972, had obtained even more support in the 1970's (see Table 
2). But the Progress Party was formed as an anti-tax party and did not mobilising around the 
issue of immigration until the mid-1990's when it had declined to about 2 per cent in opinion 
polls. Besides, the Progress Party was a pro-EU party until 1992 and again in 2001 whereas 
the Danish People’s Party supports EU membership but is highly critical and against any steps 
towards further integration. 
Table 1. Danish Parliamentary Elections, 1990-2001. Percentages. 
percentage of votes   
1990  1994  1998  2001  change 
Left Wing, subtotal  12.6  10.4  10.3  8.8  -1.5 
Social Democrats  37.4  34.6  35.9  29.1  -6.8 
Socialist parties, subtotal  50.0  45.0  46.2  37.9  -8.3 
Centre Parties, subtotal  11.4  9.3  10.7  9.2  -1.5 
Moderate right, subtotal  31.8  38.3  32.9  40.3  +7.4 
Populist Right, subtotal  6.4  6.4  9.8  12.6  +2.8 
Mod.+Pop. Right, subtotal  38.2  44.7  42.7  52.9  +10.2 
Others/outside parties    1.0  0.4  0.0  -0.4 
Valid votes, total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Table 2. Support for the extreme right in Denmark, 1973-2001. Percentages of valid votes. 
  1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1984  1987  1988  1990  1994  1998  2000 
Prog.party  15.9  13.6  14.6  11.0  8.9  3.6  4.8  9.0  6.4  6.4  2.4  0.6 
Danish PP  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  7.4  12.0 
Total  15.9  13.6  14.6  11.0  8.9  3.6  4.8  9.0  6.4  6.4  9.8  12.6 
 
In many countries, increasing support for extreme right parties has been accompanied by a 
decline in electoral participation and a decline in political trust. In Denmark, this is not so. 
Electoral participation has been steadily increasing s ince 1990  - even though Denmark 
follows, calculated on a 10-year basis, the general Scandinavian trend toward lower electoral 
participation. But in 2001, electoral participation was as high as 87.1 per cent - much higher  
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than in the other Nordic countries, and close to the average of the 1960's and 1970's. 
Table 3. Electoral participation in Denmark and in other Nordic Countries. Percentages of 
votes (including blanks) among people eligible to vote. 
  Denmark  Norway  Sweden  Finland  Average of 4 
countries 
1960's  87.3  82.8  86.4  85.0  85.4 
1970's  87.7  81.6  90.4  81.1  85.2 
1980's  86.0  83.1  89.1  78.7  84.2 
1990's  84.5  77.1  85.0  70.8  79.4 
last election  87.1  75.5  80.1  68.3  77.7 
1990  82.8         
1994  84.3         
1998  86.0         
2001  87.1         
 
Table 4. Political trust. Percentages. 
Generally speaking, how much trust do you have in Danish politicians? 
  1991  1994  1998  2001 
Very much  2  3  4  3 
Quite much  38  50  55  62 
Quite little  35  35  30  28 
Very little  10  10  9  5 
Don’t know  14  2  2  2 
Balance of opinion  -5  +8  +20  +32 
 
Another peculiarity about the election is the high level of political trust. On most indicators, 
such as the one presented in Table 4, trust in politicians was the highest ever measured in 
election surveys since the beginning of the Danish election programme in 1971. 
Table 5. European Identity, 1990-2001. Percentages . 
    Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Balance of 
opinion 
1990  17  8  75  -58 
1994  19  5  76  -59 
1998  23  12  65  -42 
I feel as much European as I feel Danish 
2001  32  13  55  -23 
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Finally, even though there was a strengthening of the ‘Euro-sceptic’ Danish People’s Party, 
this did not mean a decline in support for the European Union; on the contrary, it was 
followed by much more pro-European attitudes in the Danish electorate, both as far as 
European identity is concerned, and in relation to the Economic and Monetary Union where a 
majority voted no to the introduction of the Euro in Denmark in 2000 but would vote yes by 
now (tables 5 and 6). 
Table 6. Attitudes to the Euro in 2001. Percentages . 
  Votes yes/ 




would vote no 
Balance of 
opinion 
Voted in 1998  43  9  48  -5 
Would vote now  57  16  37  +20 
Source: Danish Election Survey, 2001. 
  
  16 
Democratic Disillusion in Eastern Europe 




In the following I present various possible indicators of democratic disillusion in six East 
European countries: the four Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia), which are expected to join the EU in the next accession round, and Bulgaria and 
Romania, which are believed to be left out. Most indicators are problematic, and can at best 
be seen as part-indicators, which should be used in combination with others (at the individual 
level!). Moreover, one cannot speak of one clear East European trend. And as far as broad 
patterns are discernable, they do not point to a widely felt democratic disillusion in the region, 
let alone to a trend towards it. 
 
The Facts 
Turnout, taken for elections to the lower house of parliament, is reasonably high to average 
throughout the region -- with the notably exception of Poland. Moreover, it doesn’t show a 
sharp drop (see Table 1). That said, turnout is a problematic indicator, as it assumes that non-
voters are dissatisfied with politics – a thesis that is refuted in Western Europe by most 
electoral studies. In addition, it assumes that those who do vote are satisfied with politics, 
which is doubtful as well.  
Table 1. Turnout 
Bulgaria  Romania  Slovakia  Hungary  Poland  Czech 
1991  84  1990  86  1990  95  1990  65  1991  43  1990  97 
1994  75  1992  76  1992  84  1994  69  1993  52  1992  85 
1997  59  1996  76  1994  76  1998  56  1997  48  1996  76 
2001  67  2000  65  1998  84  2002  71†  2001  46  1998  74 
    2002  70      2002  58† 
Source:  www.essex.ac.uk/elections/ († taken from www.electionworld.org)  
Another popular indicator for democratic disillusion is the vote for extremist parties. Table 2 
presents the support for extreme right and extreme left parties in parliamentary elections 
(lower house, first round). In short, the ‘extremist vote’ shows strong differences within the 
region (similar to Western Europe) and seems relatively stable. Moreover, and what the data 
do n ot show, extremist parties are increasingly pushed to the margins in East European 
politics (Mudde 2002).  
  17 
Table 2. Extremist Vote (2) 
Bulgaria  Romania  Slovakia  Hungary  Poland  Czech 
1991  2  1990  0  1990  24  1990  4  1991  9  1990  14 
1994  3  1992  15  1992  11  1994  5  1993  12  1992  21 
1997  1  1996  13  1994  16  1998  9  1997  6  1996  18 
2001  1  2000  22  1998  14  2002  7†  2001  18  1998  15 
    2002  15*      2002  20† 
Source: www.essex.ac.uk/elections/ († based on www.electionworld.org;* based on 
www.statistics.sk/volby2002/)  
 
The indicator of the ‘extremist vote’ is not straightforward either. First of all, not all of these 
parties (if any) will be regarded by the majority of their voters as anti-democratic. So, even 
though a vote for an ‘extremist’ party might be a protest vote, it is not said that it is a protest 
against democracy per se. Rather, and more likely, it will be a protest against the parties in 
power, past or present. In that sense, paraphrasing David Easton’s famous distinction, it 
would rather express a ‘specific’ democratic disillusion rather than a ‘diffuse’ democratic 
disillusion (cf. Easton 1965). 
Table 3. Trust in democratic institutions 
  BG  ROM  SK  H  PL  CZ  EU 
Political parties  10  13  6  18  14  12  17 
Nat. parliament  29  32  18  44  28  26  40 
Nat. government  44  41  19  46  30  36  38 
Sources: European Commission (2002). 
 
Trust in democratic institutions is another often-used indicator for measuring disappointment 
with democracy. Again, this might rather measure specific than diffuse sentiments, 
particularly given the lack of experience with a full-fledged democratic system in the region 
(see Peter Ucen’s presentation). In any case, democratic institutions are not well trusted in 
Eastern Europe, particularly the parliaments (see Table 3). However, this is not much worse 
than the situation in the EU countries, and might also reflect (at least partly) the less 
convincing activities of these institutions in the region.  
Moreover, support for the democratic regime - possibly the most pure indicator of ‘diffuse’ 
support for democracy - is above 50 percent in all but one of the countries (see Table 4). In 
Hungary and the Czech Republic this support even reaches 76 percent. Generally the majority 
of people are also optimistic about the future of the regime. Indeed, the vast majority of the 




  18 
Table 4. Attitudes toward old and new regimes and the future 
  BG  ROM  SK  H  PL  CZ 
Old Regime  57  55  61  68  ?  31 
Current Regime  58  50  39  76  ?  76 
Future  58  62  49  87  ?  83 
Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy (2001) 
At first sight the high number of people with a positive  attitude toward the old (i.e. 
communist) regime is perhaps worrying. In all but one of the countries a majority of the 
population perceives the communist regime in a positive way. However, it is doubtful that 
these evaluations refer to the political aspect of these systems. Rather, they seem to express 
nostalgia for the (perceived) equality and safety of the ‘welfare states’ of the former regimes. 
Table 5. Endorsement of non-democratic alternatives 
    BG  ROM  SK  H  PL  CZ 
Communist    24  20  29  25  15  16 
Military    12  18  6  1  6  3 
Dictatorship     29  26  23  18  27  13 
Source: Rose (2001). 
The only truly worrisome indicator is the remarkable support for non-democratic alternatives 
in virtually all the countries. Between 13 and 29 percent of the people in ECE countries would 
support a dictatorship – though ‘only’ 1 to 18 percent would support a military regime (see 
Table 5). The 13 to 29 percent support for a communist regime must again be interpreted with 
caution. However, tables 4 and 5 show that only a part of the people that evaluate the 
communist regime positively support an actual ‘return’ to that regime. 
 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to find straightforward indications (or indicators for that matter) of democratic 
disillusion in Eastern Europe. That said, it seems that democracy still has some way to go to 
convince all the people in the region of its merits. Clearly, the current democratic politicians 
are not helping much. Indicators of ‘specific democratic disillusion’ show even higher scores 
than in Western Europe. Whether East Europeans will continue to be able to separate the 
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Democratic disillusion and protest vote in France 
Nonna Mayer, CNRS, CEVIPOF Sciences Po 
 
 
The following tables present obvious symptoms of “democratic disillusion” in France 
-  The drop in voting turn out with a record level of abstention in the first round of the 2002 
presidential election (28,4%) and of the parliamentary elections (35,6%) (table 1) 
-  The sharp decline in political trust, with 83% of the voters, in April 2002, considering that 
politicians do not care what people like them think and 58% that they are corrupt (table 2) 
-  The decline in support for parties in office and the rise of protest votes, for the extreme 
left –5% for Arlette Laguiller in the 1995 presidential election, over 10% of the valid 
votes for the three trotskysts candidates in 2002- and even more for the extreme right –
almost 20% of the valid votes, Jean Marie Le Pen alone drawing 16,86% of the valid 
votes, ahead of the socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (16,18%) and qualifying himself 
for the second round where he attracted 5,5 million voters (table 3). Three quarter of Le 
Pen agree that the political class is corrupt and over 90% that politicians don’t care what 
they think.   
-  And the social bases of the FN have extended to new groups of voters, farmers and rural 
residents (table 4) and lower middle class employees. On April 21
st only two groups of 
voters still show strong reluctance, the upper and upper middle class group of salaried 
workers, and women. If only women had voted thaht day, Le Pen would have come in 
third position, after Jospin, if only men had voted, he would have been the first! 
 
What was the part played by the UE in that process?  
-  Europe was not the main issue of these elections. Among the three problems perceived as 
“the most important” at the time of voting in the 1
st round, unemployment and law and 
order came first (61 and 60%), the making of Europe  before last (9%).  
-  The European integration process was largely approved. At the same time, 63%of the 
voters saw it as  “ a good thing” and there was a majority of positive opinions in all the 
electorates, from left to right, with the exception of Le Pen and Mégret voters (37 and 
27% positive opinions). But even they did not see it as “a bad thing”, almost half consider 
it  “neither good nor bad “ (47%).  And 14% of the voters approved of the proposal of the 
Le Pen of denouncing the Maastricht treaty (45% of his own voters). 
-  Yet indirectly, the growing weight of the UE may have played a part, increasing the 
feeling that politicians are helpless to control economics and that the sovereignty of the 
states is limited. And also by blurring the traditional left right cleavage, for the UE has 
opponents, for very different reasons, on the extreme left as well as on the extreme right. 
-  Lastly, the UE arouses no strong positive feelings, mostly fears, that nurture protest votes.  
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Table 2. The decline of political trust 
Generally speaking would you say that elected representatives and public officials are mostly 
honest or mostly corrupt ? ” 
%  1977  1987  May1990  Nov1990  1991  1999  2000  2002 
Honest  32  36  40  31  21  25  28  38 
Corrupt  38  42  46  55  65  61  64  58 
NA  30  22  4  14  4  14  8  4 
 
“ Do you have the feeling that, on the whole, politicians care what people like you think: very 
much, a little, very little, hardly at all ? ”  
%  1977  1979  1983  1985  1989  1990  1995  1997*  2002 
Care  53  47  45  38  47  34  27  19  17 
Don’t   42  48  51  58  51  62  72  81  82 
NA  5  5  4  4  2  4  1  0  1 
SOFRES polls *In 1997 the answers were : a lot, enough, not much, not at all ” 
 
Table 3.Presidential scores of the extreme right in France, Fifth Republic  
1st round  Votes  % registered voters  % valid votes 
1965  1 260 208  4,4 %  5,2 % 
1974  190 921  0,6 %  0,8 % 
1988  4 375 894  11,5 %  14,4 % 
1995  4 571 138  11,4 %  15,0 % 
2002, 1
st round  5 471 739  13,3 %   19,2 %  
Le Pen  4 804 713  11,7 %  16,9 % 
Mégret  667 026  1,6 %  2.3% 
Source: Ministry of the Interior  
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Table 4. Le Pen vote 1st round 2002 presidential election by occupation* 




Clerk  Blue collar 
1988  10%  19%  14%  15%  14%  17% 
1995  10%  19%  4%  14%  18%  21% 
2002  22%  22%  13%  11%  22%  23% 
  +12  +3  -1  -4  +8  +6 
*Unemployed and retired classified according to previous occupation  
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Political developments in the Netherlands: 
Volatility & the Rise & Decline of a Populist movement. 




The Netherlands has experienced the most dramatic election ever (except perhaps for 1946, 
when the Communist Party - CPN got 10% of the vote and in 1977, when the Labour Party: 
PvdA got more than ever: 34% due to the hostage crisis. Not only the wholly unexpected 
murder on ‘newcomer’ Pim Fortuyn turned this election into a dramatic event, but even more 
dramatic has been the fact that a non-descript ‘new’ party became the second largest and got 
in government. Finally - as an unexpected “finale” - the internal strife within LPF [Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn] has led to the ending of this government [on 16 October 2002]. This government - a 
coalition formed by Christian Democrats [CDA], the Conservative Liberals [VVD] and LPF - 
turns out to be the most short-lived one since World War 2. In short, it implies new elections 
[within 3 months] and possibly even more volatile developments than already have occurred 
throughout the last decade. The account given will focus on the electoral developments in the 
Netherlands since the early 1990s, the changing political landscape in order to shed some light 
on the question how the established parties lost so much ground in the Netherlands of late. 
 
Electoral development in the Netherlands (1994-2002; see Table 1) 
Two features stand out 1) The tremendous growth of electoral volatility (EV) after 1989: 
25,4% with an all time peak in 2002 surpassing lands slide election in 1994. 2) The strong 
growth of  “New Parties” (i.c. those participating for the first time in 1989). This concerns N 
= 6 out of the 12 competing in 2002: Green Left [GRL], Socialist Party [SP], Leefbaar 
Nederland [LN], Lijst Pim Fortuyn, the Christian Union (a merger of Protestant Orthodox 
parties) and the Party of Elderly. Hence party system change in the Netherlands has been not 
only large but also strong in terms of electoral success. The ‘new’ parties gained more and 
more votes. 1989: 5%; 1994: 12%; 1998: 11%; 2002: 32%! 
Yet, this development can be observed throughout Europe:  E.V. has grown everywhere. 
However, the difference is that in a number of countries it is a within shift of votes (e.g. 
Portugal, Spain & UK) whereas in other countries the change went primarily to ‘new Parties’ 
(Austria, Denmark, France, Finland, Italy, and, of course: the Netherlands). 
In sum: Electoral change takes place in Europe as a whole, but in the Netherlands somewhat 
more drastically during the 1990s. It should also be noted that there is not (yet) a lower 
turnout in the Netherlands (only for EU-elections this is the case). However, it remains to be 
seen whether or not this has been an exception to the European trend due to the dramatic 
events that led up to the last election. Calculations derived from surveys show that probably 
5% of the electorate will not turn out in the next election.  
The Drive to the Centre: the electoral competition changed in tow ways: 1) The established 
parties converged in terms of left vs. right in particular since the elections of 1994. This has 
meant, in my view, that more room was available for ‘newcomers’ both on the right and the 
left-hand side of the Dutch political system (i.e. the new ‘left’ is equally large as the PvdA, 
and the LPF is bigger than the VVD on the right). 2) this convergence has diminished the 
room f or genuine political choice for electors and made the established parties look like a  
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‘closed shop’. Hence party competition decreased and increased the idea that most parties 
were rather rent seeking by forming self-interested coalitions. 
My hypothesis is that the New Parties could indeed make a difference in the Netherlands and 
together with a gradual shift to the right in the Party System has been conducive to a stronger 
position in parliament as compared with 1989. This structural development explains f or a 
large part what has gone on before 2002, but not yet sufficiently what happened in 2002! 
 
This difference is Pim Fortuyn! 
Two topics we will address here: 1) To what extent he and his new party are extremely 
rightwing or not; 2) Whether or not Fortuyn and his electoral movement can be considered as 
‘populist’. 
1.  On the basis of programme analysis we have compared the LPF with established parties 
throughout Europe that can be considered as member of the ‘Conservative’ party family. 
As it turns out LPF can be classified as such. Yet, many have also argued that Fortuyn 
was similar to LePen, Haider, and Blocher etcetera. Therefore we compared also the Right 
Wing Extremist parties. The results show that the LPF is not more less extremist than 
many other right-wing parties in Europe (VVD or CDU/CSU would fall in the same 
category!). Hence, LPF is a rightwing party, however, without clear extremist tendencies 
(so far). This conclusion is supported by the developments during government formation 
after the elections. Actually this turned out to be ‘business as usual’ and resulted in a 
policy agreement that was certainly ‘right wing’ in character but not dramatically different 
form previous ones. 
2.  What happened in 2002 in the Netherlands cannot be understood if one does not see that 
the ‘new’ leader of LPF: Pim Fortuyn also brought into the Dutch campaign a new style 
that was strongly build around his personality. Both aspects: personality and style can be 
seen as an introduction of ‘populism’ in Dutch politics. My arguments are (following Paul 
Taggart):  
-  strong vertical and direct ties between the ‘leader’ and the followers/supporters; 
-  explicit rhetoric on the nation, its future (based on the past) and the need for cultural 
homogeneity (but not outright xenophobic); 
-  Fortuyn presented himself as a ‘crisis manager’ (Prime Minister to be!) to remedy the 
Welfare State, the Big State and the Permissiveness in Dutch society; 
-  The LPF condemned the political elites in the Hague, the traditional parties and thus 
questioned the legitimacy of Dutch representative Government.  
 
Taken together we can conclude that both the person and the new party made a crucial 
difference to the Dutch election result of 2002. It remains a counterfactual whether or not his 
untimely death would have meant another result. The recent developments, however, show 
that without a leader and an organisation and without a “radical” programme (i.e. transparent 




  24 
Conclusions 
The past decade has shown a dramatic change and ‘confusion’ in the Dutch party system. 
Voters do turn out but not to vote automatically for the established parties. On the contrary, 
electoral volatility is mainly beneficial for new parties, many of them being ‘protest parties’ 
or those parties that outflank the traditional ones in terms of policy pursuit. 
Additionally, it must be observed the ‘style of politics’ has changed. One could well say that 
this is a definitive farewell to ‘Consociationalism’. For instance it implies an end to ‘elitism’, 
i.e. delegated representation that it is accepted by the public. It also means that ‘new parties’, 
i.e. competitors on the electoral market have a much higher chance to succeed (e.g. SP and 
LPF in 2002). As far as there is disillusionment with democracy it is not yet exemplified in 
lower turnouts (except for EU-elections) but rather switching loyalties by the elector.  
Finally: it should be stressed that, if the ‘political elite’ or establishment does not alter its 
attitude and behaviour, populist movement or radical parties will have more room for 
manoeuvre than ever before. This may well be conducive to a lower degree of “governance” 
and not only become visible in a loss of representative government, but also a growing loss of 
legitimacy of the democratic state and the rule of law. Depending on whether or not new 
personalities emerge and the learning behaviour of the ‘old’ parties increased Dutch politics 
will remain in dire straits for some time to come. 
Table 1: number of seats by party in lower chamber from 1989 - 2002 (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal: total N = 150) 
Party  Party Family  1989  1994  1998  2002  98-02 
+/- 
Socialist Party (SP)  Socialists  -  2  5  9  +4 
Green Left (GRL)  New Left/ecologists  6  5  11  11  0 
PvdA  Social-Democrats  49  37  45  23  -22 
D66  Progressive Liberals  12  24  14  7  -7 
Leefbaar Nederland  Regional Coalition  -  -  -  2  +2 
CDA  Christian Democrats  54  34  29  43  +14 
VVD  Conservative Liberals  22  31  38  23  -15 
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)  Right-wing populist  -  -  -  26  +26 
SGP, GPV, RPF 
(CU=RPF+GPV) 
Orthodox Christians  6  7  8  6  -2 
CD, CP86  Extreme (near racist) right  1  3  0  -  - 
Others    [concerned Party of Elderly]  0  7  0  0  - 
 
Electoral Volatility  
 











Source: Keman, 2002; there is no electoral threshold [0.67% of the vote equals one seat]; 
Electoral Volatility is measured according to Pedersen, 1979. 
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Annexes 
 
Figure 2. Left versus Right since 1977
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Figure 4. Progressive vs. Conservative in 2002
Conservative                                           Progressive









































































Figure 5. Dutch and European Conservative Parties
Conservative                                        Progressive
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Figure 6. Pim Fortuyn and the Extreme Right in Europe
Conservative                                        Progressive
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Disillusionment with Democracy and Populism in Poland 
Radoslaw Markowski, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences 
 
 
(1) General remark and a word of caution: Western dissatisfaction with democracy and 
populist/radicalist trends are ontologically different phenomena (at least partly) from the 
manifestations of similarly dubbed processes in East-Central part of the continent. This is so 
for at least three reasons:  
1)  The different socio-historical context in which the stable democracies of Western 
Europe are today as compared to the CEECs. To start with a major difference i s the 
very existence and stage at which the nation-state formation Dire developments in 
Slovakia and Croatia, the two instances in which state/nation-building has been sought 
instead of democratic institutions, is very telling in this respect.  
CEECs populist/xenophobic movements and parties differ clearly from the current 
Western phenomenon in that there is no single party that resembles the New Radical 
Right of the West. All of these CEECs parties are definitely opting for state 
protectionism and economically leftist ideas. Neo-liberal stances are totally missing.  
2)  In the post-World War II West, “populist” movements never gained power (the 
debatable case of Berlusconi being, if one wishes, the only exception). In Eastern 
Europe several countries had experienced the rule of “populist” governments (cf. 
Slovakia, Belarus, Romania and their strong occurrences in Ukraine, some fission 
products of Yugoslavia).  On the distinction between populists as incumbents and as 
contenders for power in the following parts. 
3)  In the West and East we seem to witness different focuses of the “populist” 
movements/parties. In the West they most often question the political organisations of 
the state (governments, parliaments, parties) and sometimes the performance of 
democracy, while in the East the critique is more widespread and broad, challenging 
the newly established institutions as well as the essence of political community (the 
inclusive-exclusive debate) and fairly frequently the axiological bases of the regime, 
as well as the very ideals of liberal democracy. 
 
(2) Defining “populism” is certainly a task that exceeds this short presentation. Let me 
however try to enumerate three facets (types) of “populism” as they surface in Poland. I tend 
to believe this distinction – to a different degree – is valid for many other CEECs: 
1.“procedural populism” – questioning the necessity, aimed at limiting the role of the: 
(i) democratic procedures, (ii) basic liberal institutions: parliament, parties, (iii) elites 
of all pedigree, and (iv) non-electoral constitutional bodies designed to check and 
balance contemporary democratic procedures (Central Bank, Constitutional Court and 
the like) 
2. “substantive (issue/content-driven) populism” – challenging policies and policy 
stances concerning “distributive” issues (welfare provisions, social assistance, state 
interventionism, taxation, egalitarian justice, etc.) 
3.  “axiological  (value-oriented)  populism”  – defending identities, faith, national 
symbols etc, in a nutshell – focused on "non-distributive" issues.  
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Populism #2 is characteristic of LEFTIST populist parties (in Poland: Samoobrona and PSL 
which are axiologically (#3) either indifferent or diffusely-neutral, respectively) 
Populism #3 is predominantly associated with the RIGHT, and their public axiological 
rhetoric (in Poland: LRP). 
In broader context, one may claim the first pertains to the old Burkean dilemma: the new 
populists aim at switching from "trustee" to "delegate" representation relationship. The second 
is oriented towards " change", in everyday political practice it is active in organising radical 
political actions etc. (usually practised by leftist populists). The third is "conservative", past-
oriented in nature, aimed at preserving the, mainly cultural, status quo. 
 
(3) “Political EXIT” - non-voting as an indicator of disillusionment : The Polish case, indeed, 
deserves separate attention as the turnout rates have been dramatically low since the very first 
(semi-free) election of 1989 (62%) and have never exceeded 68% (second round of 
parliamentary election 1995). Most of the time the figure in parliamentary elections was 
below 50 %, in presidential ones between 50 and 65 percent and in local elections, usually 
around 40 %.  
Explanation of this phenomenon is complicated, but there are several crucial factors. The 
Polish low turnout figures are to start with not so much an indicator of disillusionment with 
democracy as with politics in general. In addition, several other factors account for the 
enormously low electoral participation of Poles: the shape of the social structure (low 
educational attainment, proportion of marginalised social strata  – numerous segments of 
autarkic peasantry, extremely high post-war mobility  – to the re-gained territories, no 
traditions of civil society in the Russian partition; absenteeism inherited as a communist 
legacy, deeply rooted anti-partyism, etc) 
Several traits of Polish non-voters should be mentioned at this point: 
a)  although they are numerous, they are not radical; their spatial location (measured by 
ten policy-stances) indicates they are to be found right in the middle of the Polish 
space of political competition spectrum with - more or less - equal distance to major 
political parties.  
b)  About one-third of these non-voters enter and exit  the electoral market at each 
election, contributing to minor shifts in support for particular parties. The growth of 
Samoobrona at the last election can by no means be explained by mobilisation of non-
voters (frequent interpretation by both Polish and foreign political commentators) as 
almost 93% of their 2001 supporters were active voters in the 1997 election. 
c)  Polish electoral activity is much more determined by “political dislikes (hatred)” than 
by political attachments or identities. The phenomenon points to the fact that the party 
identifications are rather weak and volatile (figures of volatility are astronomic if 
computed on party bases; significantly less so if on the basis of “party families”). 
Briefly, the Polish electorate is to a considerable extent composed of “anti-voters” and 
non-voters. 
d)  As transformational time passes by, Polish non-voters are becoming more similar to 
the voters in their policy/issue preference profile. This, accompanied by the fuzzy, 
though numerous group of SLD supporters, tells us fair amount of the story - Polish 
electorates and non-voters have become in 2001 much more heterogeneous. The 
desperate search for the relevant party continues.  
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e)  Polish problems with institutionalised electoral activity can also be interpreted, 
following Linz and Stepan's (1996) ideas, as problems in smooth switching from 
(overmobilised) civil society to (consolidated) political community. 
f)  The major part of the blame for the continuing high abstention rates goes however to 
the behaviour and deeds of the elites. Permanent fluctuation of organisational 
structures, mergers and dissolutions of parties going far beyond "ideological 
necessity" to mention just a few, had created a situation in which it was close to 
impossible to develop cognitive maps which allow us to identify parties likely to 
represent individuals and particular groups, not to mention the creation of political 
attachments and identities.  
 
(4) Between 1997 and 2001 Polish NES data records a significant worsening of the public 
mood concerning basic indicators of democratic performance.  
The main "barometer" question concerning "satisfaction with the performance of democracy 
in a given country" shows a dramatic decrease from 54% in 1997 to 34% in 2001. A long 
story would have to follow to explain why, but what seems worth emphasising is that 
satisfaction with the democratic performance does not run along political winners vs losers 
line. Quite to the contrary, it is highly correlated with the ideological camp individuals fall 
into: the winning "left" is much less satisfied with democracy than the ousted from power 
"right" supporters. 
Worsening of other "efficacy", "alienation" and the like indicators looks as follows: 
(percentage positive answers to the survey items, between 1997 and 2001) 
"voting makes sense as it can change things"  from 27 to 20 percent 
"parties care about what people think"  from 15 to   9 percent 
"who is in power matters"  from 73 to  57 percent 
"parties are necessary for the state to function"  from 60 to  51 percent 
"is there any party you feel close to"  from 64 to  54 percent 
 
(5) Polish “populist” parties. Polish and foreign commentators label as such two political 
entities existing currently on the Polish political arena: SAMOOBRONA (Self-defence) and 
LPR (League of Polish Families).  
One caveat at the beginning is due: as of 2001, compared to the 1997 election, almost all 
parties and their electorates have moved towards the economically populist parts of the 
political space and towards, though less visibly, the secular part. This applies also to the major 
player, Polish social-democracy (SLD), as it had a very “irresponsibly promising”, populist 
and overbidding 2001 campaign. The exact characteristics of these two “populist” parties will 
follow, but the main point I want to make (based on complicated empirical analyses of the 
Polish NES 2001 data) is the following: Samoobrona’s supporters are by far less radical than 
most  political observers tend to believe. Among ten monitored issues, which cover most of 
the policy space, only in one instance (EU enlargement) Samoobrona followers reveal the 
most radical stance (in fact accompanied by other main-stream parties’ electorates). Where 
they substantially differ from other parties is in their radical stance towards  “procedural 
politics” (evaluation of the functioning of the basic democratic institutions, satisfaction with 
democracy, efficacy indicators, necessity of parties, fairness of elections and the like). 
Nevertheless they do not differ that much in terms of their policy preferences.  
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Both Polish populist/nationalist parties have a clear socio-demographic profile. Samoobrona 
has transparent "male" support (2.5 to 1 ratio)and, contrary to many claims by those who are 
too lazy to look at empirical data, it has no r ural overrepresentation, although its 
programmatic appeal is addressed mostly to rural electorate. Their supporters are very poorly 
educated, occupying rather low professional positions, falling into all age cohorts and clearly 
secular. 
League of Polish Families (LPR) supporters are more evenly distributed between sexes. Their 
education is rather poor, professional position differentiated but rather low, more likely to be 
found among housewives and other strata "outside the labour market", significantly 
overrepresented among frequent churchgoers. 
It is important to note that - unlike their Czech (Sladek's Republicans) or Hungarian (Csurka's 
"justice" party) counterparts  - their "nationalism" is inward-oriented and has virtually no 
ethnic, "blood" superiority overtones. In a nutshell, they are aggressively critical of the 
behaviour and deeds of the Polish (liberal) elites and focus on the economic protectionist 
(Samoobrona) or cultural defensive (LPR) positions. 
In terms of their parliamentary positions, they  are clearly in a minority, but, what seems 
obvious by now, are aspiring to expand to control the policies via "normal politics". Briefly, 
they hardly can be called anti-system. Because of their entry into the parliament, no surprise, 
the Polish lower house has become more "representative" than before - 25-30% of Poles 
skeptical of EU integration now have parliamentary representation.  
Finally, Samoobrona seems to be more pragmatically-driven in its opposition to EU 
integration and objects mainly to the very way in which Poland negotiates entry, while LPR 
seems to have more fundamental and ideological reservations towards entry. In economic 
terms (including the issue of FDI, privatisation mode and the like) followers of both parties do 
not differ significantly from the electorates of the two incumbent parties - SLD and PSL. 
 
(6) Channelling discontent is of utmost important for any political system; for the new ones in 
particular. In Poland individuals dissatisfied with democracy are relatively unevenly 
distributed, overrepresented, of course, among the non-voters and the radical populist parties 
following. The so-called "Dissatisfied Democrats" (conceptualised by D. Fuchs and H -D. 
Klingemann, as those who cherish the democratic ideal simultaneously being critical of the 
democratic performance in a given country) as well as clear Autocrats are also 
overrepresented among these groups. In 2001 the "dissatisfied democrats" amounted to 60% 
of Samoobrona followers, 46% of PSL (peasant incumbent party), 45% of non-voters and 
37% of LPR. Fortunately the proportion of "dissatisfied democrats" to "very-likely-autocrats" 
(those who poorly value the democratic performance AND democratic ideal) is about 4/3 to 1 
among these groups.  
 
(7) Geographical spread of populist support: 
1.  in the regions of weak social bonds  (re-gained territories after WW II) 
2.  regions of no civil society traditions (former Russian partition) 
3.  undergoing radical economic deterioration (dynamics more important than static 
indicators) 
4.  in regions proximate to the West (mechanisms of relative evaluation at work) 
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Democratic Disillusion in the United Kingdom 
Dr. Paul Taggart, Sussex European Institute 
 
 
In looking for evidence of democratic disillusion in the UK I examine a number of indicators 
and deal briefly with the question of Europe in the concluding points. In the UK overall there 
is little evidence of a significant decline in support for democracy. In relative terms there is 
actually little evidence of a democratic distemper in comparison with other West European 
states.  
Electoral Trends 
If we look at levels of turnout at general elections since 1974, there is a slight decline since 
1974 but it is difficult to discern a clear trend with fluctuations both up and down. There was 
a severe drop in turnout at the last General Election in 2001. This may well be due to the state 
of the opposition Conservative Party and the apparent inevitability of a second victory for the 
(New) Labour Party of Tony Blair.  
 
Table 1: Turnout in UK General Elections
2 
1974 Feb  1974 Oct  1979  1983  1987  1992  1997  2001 
78.7%  72.8  72.0  72.7  75.3  77.7  71.3  59.5 
Sources: British Governments and Elections since 1945 
http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/uktable.htm  
Support for xenophobic parties of the far right is very limited in the UK. Looking only at 
support for the National Front/British National Party, it is clear that the far right has negligible 
electoral support. Occasionally attention in the UK is focused on localised electoral success of 
the far right, such as in Tower Hamlets in London or Oldham in Lancashire but this is 
invariably in areas where racial tensions are high and electoral support are rarely meaningful 
in national terms. It is notable that the UK, unlike most other European countries has very low 
neo-fascist or new populist mobilisation. 
Table 2: Electoral Support for the British National Party/National Front at UK General 
Elections 
1974 Feb  1974 Oct  1979  1983  1987  1992  1997  2001 
3.6%  3.1  1.4  1.1  -  0.7  0.1  0.2 
Sources: various 
Looking at whether the political parties have suffered a decline, we can assess (with caution) 
one aspect of their survival through looking at membership. Evidence here (table 3 below) 
shows all three major parties have declined since 1974 but that the trend is not  uniform for 
                                                                 
2 It is worth noting that under devolution turnout for the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary elections and elections for 
the Welsh National Assemby were 54% and 46% respectively.  
  33 
the parties with Labour seeing a massive loss of membership in mid-80s but thereafter 
experiencing a gradual increase. 
Table 3: Party Membership in the UK since 1974  (in thousands) 
Year  1974  1979  1983  1987  1992  1997  2001 
Cons  1500  1350  1200  1000  500  400  350 
Lab  692  666  295  289  280  420  361 
Lib Dem  190  145  145*  138*  100  100  90 
Source: Webb, Farrell & Holiday (eds.) Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies 
(OUP, 2002 forthcoming) 
*Includes SDP membership 
 
Public Opinion 
Public opinion polls show there is little indication of a decline in satisfaction with national 
democracy and only marginal increases in dissatisfaction. Using Eurobarometer data since 
1996, it is also clear that levels of satisfaction are generally higher than EU averages and 
levels of distrust are lower. 
Table 4: Satisfaction with National Democracy in the UK 
Year  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Satisfaction  63%  64  -  62  64  67 
Dissatisfaction  25%  25  -  28  27  27 
Sources: Eurobarometers (various) 
 
Popular Mobilisation 
One measure of democratic disillusion which is not numerical is the increasing use of protest 
tactics and mass extra-parliamentary mobilisation which has occurred in the UK. While anti-
globalisation/anti-capitalist protests in the City of London on recent May Days fit with the 
protest tactics of the left, what is more notable is the new mass mobilisation of movements not 
of the left. The key examples would be the fuel protests in 2000 and 2001 where petrol 
refineries were blockaded by truck drivers protesting fuel prices, and the mobilisation of the 
Countryside Alliance (including a mass protest in London in September 2002). The 
Countryside Alliance is an unusual coalition of pro-fox hunting activists and other rural 
movements and is at odds with the present Labour government.  
 
Conclusions 
•  The UK appears to be remarkably resilient from trends of democratic disillusion seen 
elsewhere in Europe. 
•  Public opinion, electoral abstentionism and support for xenophobic parties show little 
evidence of democratic distemper but there is more evidence in terms of extra-
parliamentary protest and in declining membership of political parties.   
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•  In looking at the influence of European integration on these trends it should be noted that 
this lack of democratic disillusion goes hand in hand with the highest levels of party and 
public Euroscepticism in EU member and candidate states. 
•  Any 'Europeanisation' of trends towards democratic disillusion are limited with most 
trends seeming to be  national but with some Europeanisation of social movement 
activism. 
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Democratic Disillusion in Slovakia. 
Peter Ucen, International Republican Institute, Bratislava 
 
 
Data for Slovakia will be presented elsewhere (Cas Mudde) so it would be useless to replicate 
them here. I will present some data collected in Slovakia by local agencies, but this data is far 
from being so complete, consistent, and comparable as those from the Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer and similar. I will mainly focus on a narrative explanation of the context. 
(Most of the data is courtesy of FOCUS polling agency and Institute for Public Affaires (IVO) 
in Bratislava.) 
Before I present an empirical case for Slovakia, I would like to point out a few caveats 
concerning the troublesome aspects of research on democratic disillusionment in post-
Communist countries. 
The notion of democratic disillusion, as currently conceptualised by western scholars, pertains 
to societies where democracy has been in place for a prolonged period of time (and this is 
certainly not the case of post-Communist states). It refers to the processes of change that took 
place among populations of democratic countries as far as their relationship to the system of 
representative institutions and to political elites is concerned (decreasing trust, increasing 
protest vote).  Thus, the concept inherently assumes populations, which were once satisfied 
with democracy are now becoming increasingly disenchanted with it.  
However, people in post-Communist societies have not yet had a chance to be satisfied with 
their democratic regimes as they are generally perceived as not satisfactorily developed yet, 
unconsolidated. Instead, Post-Communist populations were once full of various expectations 
as to what democracy should deliver to them and various perceptions of what democracy -  
which were not rooted in their life experience.   
That is why, I suggest, we have to bear in mind these different premises when measuring 
post-Communist people’s dissatisfaction with democracy. It is reasonable to assume that 
when we are measuring their current attitudes to democracy in polls, we are actually 
measuring how they tackle a situation that their expectations might not have been met. This 
difference suggests caution in interpreting popular reactions to disillusionment with the 
working of their democracies.  
Different Premises 
West  Populations once satisfied with their 
democratic regimes 
Dissatisfaction with the decaying 
performance of these regimes 
Post-Communist 
countries 
Populations with various empirically 
unrooted expectations on democracy 
Dissatisfaction with the fact that their 
expectations have not been met 
 
For full-fledged research on this topic in post-Communist conditions I would propose to 
answer an additional question before embarking on an analysis of the processes which are 
typically in the West identified as syndromes of democratic disillusion, namely growing 
abstentionism and protest vote. This would be “What people in post-Communist countries 
mean by democracy when expressing their attitude to it? What they expect it should deliver?” 
This should provide a context for interpreting the rates of their dissatisfaction and trends in 
the aforementioned syndromes.  
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1. Meaning of democracy and expectations attached to it 
Perceptions of the majority of the population are contingent upon a political context, namely 
on respondents’ evaluation of the social and economic situation and on the incumbency factor 
– the fact as to which party/bloc is in government and in opposition shapes supporters’ 
perceptions what democracy should be (namely in terms of how the opposition should be 
treated). 
According to some researchers, reference for ‘democracy as procedure’ has been lagging 
behind the ‘democracy as material benefit’ but its support is consolidating. Except for the 
1990-91 period, when the ‘rights and liberties’ aspect prevailed as the dominant feature of 
democracy, the majority of the population in the 1990s perceived democracy in terms of 
socio-economic ‘substance’ (satisfaction of economic needs). During civic polarisation under 
the Meciar III government there was an increase of sensitivity to ‘rights and liberties’ by 
opposition supporters. After the defeat of Meciar, there was another similar increase as his 
supporters became sensitive to it after moving into the opposition. After the turn of centuries 
there are signs of recovery for the perception of democracy’s priorities in terms of freedoms 
and procedures.   
There is, however, other research which claims that Slovaks’ perceptions of democracy has 
always been dominated by the ‘freedom and liberties’ aspect. In spite of this disagreemnt, it is 
clear that social and economic concerns strongly influence people’s perceptions of 
democracy.  Moreover, the Consolidation of Democracy Project suggests t hat popular 
perceptions of democracy are today more confused that they were in 1990. 
Table 1. Perceptions of Democracy’s Priorities (December 1994) 
Satisfaction of economic needs  42% 
Freedom  21% 
Equal justice for all  18% 
Economic prosperity  7% 
Source: Institute of Public Affairs (IVO), Bratislava 
 
Table 2. “What is democracy” (open-ended question 2001) 
Freedom  50,7% 
Legal-institutional democracy  13.2% 
Participation  12.1% 
Other  8.3% 




2. Support for democracy as (the best) principle/form of government 
Unfortunately, here there is no consistent measurement for the entire post-1989 period 
because pollsters have been changing questions in polls.  Moreover, there are hardly any  
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‘pure’ measures. The ‘impure’ measures such as preference for current regime as opposed to 
previous one clearly mix the evaluation of democracy as a principle and of the performance of 
a democratic regime (see section below).  Indirectly, it is possible to conclude that preference 
for democracy as the best form of government in Slovakia prevails over preference to 
alternatives at least  in ratio 2:1. 
Table 3. “Which do you think would be better for your country?” (%) 
  1990  2001 
One-party system  11.2  21.8 
Multiparty system  88.8  78.2 
Source: Consolidation of Democracy Project (H. D. Klingemann) 
 
3. Satisfaction with performance of democratic regime  
Previous research (Toka) suggests that in post-Communist countries there is ‘a substantial 
correlation between regime support and popular evaluations of economic conditions’.  
Persistently the rather low esteem of the current regime in Slovakia should be interpreted in 
these terms as well as in terms of frequent identification of the regime with incumbency. 
Table 4. “Satisfied with  current regime” (% agree) 
May 1990  71 
Oct 1990  37 
May 1991  21 
Apr 1992  26 
Source: IVO, Bratislava 
 
Table 5. “Does the current regime have more negatives or positives than the previous one?” 
  More negatives  More positives 
Jan 1992  37  42 
Oct 1993  51  35 
Dec 1994  45  37 
Dec 1995  39  43 
Jan 1997  42  36 
Nov 2000  48  32 
Source: IVO, Bratislava 
 
Winners tend to praise democratic performance on the basis of the ‘freedoms and liberties’ 
aspect of democracy.  Their negative evaluations come from frustration with democratic 
regress and international isolation of the country under Meciar.  
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Losers tend to be alienated from the democratic regime on the basis of its insufficiency to 
cope with a social impact of transformation. 
 
Table 6. “In whose interest is the country run?” (%) 
  1990  2001 
In the interest of majority of people  62.5  14.8 
In the interest of few groups  37.5  85.2 
Source: Consolidation of Democracy Project (H. D. Klingemann) 
 
4. Trust in specific institutions of democracy 
In general, the army, president and church enjoy relatively high and stable degree of trust. 
Trust in political parties, as such, has not been measured by local pollsters.  There are, 
however, some data available from the Consolidation of Democracy Project: 
 
Table 7. Attitudes to Political Parties (% agree) 
Statement  1990  2001 
We need parties if we want democracy  82  78.1 
I can not see any difference between the existing 
parties 
30.8  34.3 
Parties only serve their leaders’ interests  45.9  68.6 
 
Trust in key institutions of democracy  – government and parliament, has been  fluctuating 
remarkably.  The reason is that it is highly dependent on a political context, namely on 
incumbency (who, which party, controls the institutions) and the  involvement and the role of 
the institutions in a dominant political conflict (Meciar vs. ‘democratic opposition’).  
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Table 8. Trust in Government (1991 – 2002) 
Date  Trust (%)  Political context 
Mar 1991  68  Meciar I government, few weeks before PM’s dismissal 
May 1991  29  After dismissal of PM Meciar 
Apr 1992  31  End of Carnogursky government 
Mar 1993  47  Meciar II government, first months of independence 
Oct 1993  40  Crisis of Meciar II government 
May 1994  55  Interim anti-Meciar government of PM Moravcik 
Dec 1994  52  End of interim government, beginning of Meciar III govn’t 
Jun 1998  36  End of Meciar III government 
Nov 1998  55  Start of Dzurinda I government (anti-Meciar opposition) 
Jan 1999  57  Climax of Dzurinda I popularity 
Mar 2000  35  Mid-term of Dzurinda I 
July 2002  23  End of Dzurinda I government 
Oct 2002  50+  Respondents satisfied with assumed Dzurinda II government 
Source: IVO, Bratislava. 
 
5. Trends in electoral abstentionism 
There is a continuous mild drop in turnout interrupted only by a massive turnout mobilisation 
campaign in 1998. 
Table 9 . Electoral Abstention Rates, Parliamentary and Popular Presidential Elections 
(percentages) 
Election  1990  1992  1994  1998
1  1999 Pres.  2002
2 
Turnout  95.39  84.20  75.65  84.24  73.83  70.06 
Abstention  4.61  15.80  24.35  15.76  26.17  29.94 
Wasted votes
3   7.70  23.80  10.95  5.78  -  18.09 
Source: Slovak Statistical Office, http://volby.statistics.sk 
1 Indicates presence of a major external turnout mobilisation campaign (successful) 
2 Indicates presence of a major external turnout mobilisation campaign (unsuccessful) 
3 Votes cast for parties and coalitions which failed to reach a legal threshold for parliamentary    
   representation 
 
6. Patterns of protest vote 
In Slovakia, there is a politically motivated proliferation of suggestions as to which parties 
should be considered extreme, non-standard, anti-system etc. Practically all parties which 
base their appeal on some forms of critique of and attack on the establishment/mainstream 
and on critiques of regime performance are labelled so. The usual suspects of weaker 
commitment to democracy have been:  
-  National populist HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia)   
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-  Extreme (majoritarian nationalist) Right,  SNS (Slovak National Party) +  PSNS (Real 
Slovak National Party) 
-  SOP (Party of Civic Understanding), targeting mainstream from the centre 
-  ANO (Alliance of New Citizen), targeting mainstream from the right-of-centre position 
-  SMER (Direction), targeting mainstream from the left-of-centre position 
-  KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia), unreformed Communists, original refusal of the 
post-1989 regime 
-  ZRS (Association of Workers of Slovakia), late-coming refusal of the post-1989 regime, 
party of the victims of regime change 
 
Overall, only four parties, SNS (PSNS), ZRS and KSS qualify as extreme (tiny extremist 
groupings are omitted).  
Table 10. Trends in electoral support for  extreme parties in Slovakia (% of votes) 
Election  1990  1992  1994  1998  2002 
SNS (PSNS)  14  7.9  5.4  9  7 
KSS   13  0.8  2.7  2.8  6.3 
ZRS  -  -  7.3  1.3  0.5 
Total extreme  27  8.7  15.4  13.1  13.8 
 
Conclusions: 
-  Preference for democracy as a desirable principle of government in Slovakia prevails over 
alternative forms 
-  People perceive democracy mainly in terms of rights and liberties but evaluate it mainly in 
terms of economic performance.  Moreover, a democratic regime is frequently identified 
with incumbency. 
-  Dissatisfaction with the performance of a democratic regime is widespread, but even 
though it brings about various reactions, it does not significantly increase support for 
extreme parties, which are moreover increasingly marginalized (out of parliament or 
isolated when in it) 
-  There is a mild drop in electoral turnout but it is difficult to convincingly attribute this 
trend to dissatisfaction with democracy  
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SYNTHESIS OF THE DISCUSSION 
Jean Louis Arnaud 
 
 
Are Europeans falling prey to democratic disenchantment? An Academic seminar was held in 
Paris in October to address the issue, on the initiative of the research and study group Notre 
Europe, the  Institut d'études politiques of Paris and the European University Institute of 
Florence. The purpose of the day's discussions was to draw lessons from the protest votes and 
demonstrations of dissatisfaction expressed in most countries of our continent over the last 
two years – reflected in spreading voter apathy, significantly reduced support for traditional 
parties of both right and left and the electoral successes of populist protest movements that are 
often close to the far right. 
 
  These electoral outcomes were unexpected and prompted many questions. 
Certain common characteristics are obvious: notably the accusation that politicians and 
technocrats have been unable to cope with the economic changes taking place at global level, 
and have also very often ignored the real concerns of their electorate by failing to respond to 
market uncertainties and the fears these have generated. 
 
Nonetheless, the situations in the various countries are sufficiently diverse to invite 
caution and discourage a one-size-fits-all explanation. Abstention has sharply increased in 
southern Europe but has spared the Scandinavian countries. And we have not seen the 
emergence of any transnational populist movement; instead, alongside the traditional parties, 
a mosaic of groupings has formed, not all of which belong to the far right. 
 
 
A fragmented political landscape 
 
Any disenchantment there may be stems from very distinct circumstances and its 
nature must therefore be further clarified. A protest vote does not necessarily mean that voters 
are not satisfied with the way their political system works. As suggested by Peter Ucen of the 
International Republican Institute of Bratislava, we should refrain from comparing what is 
happening in the central and Eastern European countries, where democracy is all the more 
fragile since it is very young, with the change in political customs of the western European  
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countries, where it has been in practice for two centuries. And we can agree with Stefano 
Bartolini, of the European University Institute of Florence, that to speak of democratic 
disillusionment implies that citizens had illusions in the first place – something he doubts, at 
least in Italy's case. 
To understand this European kaleidoscope, we will retain the method put forward by 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann, of the Wissenschaftszentrum in Berlin, who believes the analysis 
should revolve around three questions: 
-  the exercise of citizenship; 
-  the forms of democracy selected; 
-  the role given to Europe in the most important choices, in particular 
with respect to redistribution. 
 
Throughout the seminar, we saw that the question of citizenship cannot be dealt on 
without tackling the joint issues of immigration and integration. Rather than the migrant per 
se, it is the non-integrated migrant who is resented. The lack of integration is what fuels 
xenophobia, when the migrants' own culture makes them stand out and the trend towards a 
multicultural society seems to threaten the image of national identity and the place of each 
individual in society. 
 
These fears are strongest in the working-class electorate. For a long time, these voters 
trusted the Social-Democrat parties to distribute the benefits of the welfare State as widely as 
possible. The trust has gone and the right-wing parties today claim they are doing as much, if 
not more, than their left-wing counterparts in this respect. Meanwhile, fringe movements take 
every opportunity to pinpoint failings on both sides and aggressively condemn the inability of 
the large parties to satisfy the most basic needs of voters. 
 
The need for security – the corollary of distrust for all that is foreign – stems from 
disturbances due to incivility as well as the fear of crime, which is perceived as being rapidly 
rising. In a world where the prevailing impression is that "everything is going to the dogs", 
there is naturally an aspiration to return, through law and order, to the golden age of a well-
policed society. 
 
The feeling of insecurity also feeds on a diffuse fear of globalisation, which is 
prompting tens of thousands of demonstrators to take to the streets and, if necessary, cross  
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oceans. As pointed out by Paul Taggart, of the Sussex European Institute, the large 
government parties have little control over the street movements triggered by globalisation or 
the demonstrations that are staged to defend established traditions – such as fox hunting in the 
United Kingdom – and that act as a refuge against globalisation and cosmopolitanism. 
 
Can the traditional political machines harness these new forms of protest for their own 
benefit, as they have done in the past with other movements? Not very likely, observed Cas 
Mudde, of the University of Antwerp, pointing out the ability of the new groupings to build 
up their own momentum independently of any other political and ideological reference. 
 
The daily practice of democracy is no longer what it was a century or even half a 
century ago. All participants agreed on that point. Fewer people are joining political parties, 
noted Gérard Grunberg, of the Paris Institut d'études politiques, and institutions no longer 
enjoy the same degree of trust as before, even if this disaffection does not necessarily mean 
that people have given up the democratic ideal itself. What is in question is the way 
representative democracy works. Modern, emancipated and cultivated citizens are no longer 
willing to delegate their voice unreservedly to elected representatives. They wish to do so on 
an ad hoc basis and on specific issues. The militant citizen advocating an all-encompassing 
vision of society has been replaced by a consumer citizen, who picks and chooses from the 
offerings available. The statistics have shown that, after having been initially attracted by 
populist political proposals at local level, people can subsequently turn them down on the 
assumption that they will not work at national level. The media – and commercial television 
networks in particular – play a predominant role in these trends. 
 
 
A missing Europe? 
 
And where is Europe in all this? Nowhere, concluded the participants, who pointed out 
that the European Union is not the subject of any identifiable electoral issue. Only the far right 
– where it exists – is openly hostile, more out of xenophobic habit rather than for any specific 
institutional reasons. The European Union, which is absent from the everyday political debate, 
is often said to be suffering from democratic deficit. To bring it closer to its citizens, some 
observers have suggested the use of forms of democracy that are more direct than a  
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representative system. The latter is poorly adapted, in their view, to a union of 500 million 
people, and they believe institutions such as the Swiss referendum would be better. 
Is Europe exacerbating the problem or, on the contrary, can it provide the solution? 
Philippe Schmitter, of the European University Institute of Florence, noted the paradoxical 
dilemma facing the European Union: either to move closer to those who derive no benefit 
from it, or to favour those who are already benefiting from it, given that the mechanisms that 
could allow it to make choices do not exist. 
 
For Jean Nestor, secretary general of Notre Europe, the eclipse of European issues in 
national politics is having disastrous consequences both for the political elite and for the way 
ordinary citizens perceive Europe. The phenomenon is particularly dangerous, he said, for the 
Social-Democrat parties. They need a European level to ensure the credibility of proposals for 
increased regulation  – proposals that are liable to bring back voters who have tended to 
abandon them. Meanwhile, the right's commitment to Europe has cooled somewhat further to 
the prudent and pragmatic approaches taken by leaders such as Aznar and Berlusconi. 
 
 
The presentations are detailed in the  preceding  sheets. We might highlight the 
following points: 
-  The observations of J￿rgen Goul Andersen, of the University of Aalborg, about the 
2001 elections in Denmark, which saw not only the triumph of the right, and even the 
far right, but also the highest turnout rate (87%) and highest rate of satisfaction with 
politicians (62%) of the past 10 years. Surveys have also shown that voters are 
increasingly favourable to the euro, and that the Danes' awareness of their European 
identity has increased somewhat unexpectedly. 
-  The comments of Norma Mayer, of the Paris  Centre national de recherches 
scientifiques, criticising national politicians who shun their responsibilities by blaming 
Brussels for all wrongs. Hence the general public's feeling not only that they are the 
victims of a plot, but also that their national elected representatives are not telling 
them about it. 
-  The pessimistic vision that Flemish voters in Belgium have of their future: 50% of 
persons surveyed believe inequalities and exclusion will increase and are losing faith 
in the police's ability to protect them, while 80% are convinced that insecurity will  
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continue to rise. In the opinion of Mark Elchardus, of the  Université libre de 
Bruxelles, this outlook explains the successes of the far-right Vlaams Blok. This 
Flemish nationalist party created in 1978 won 3% of the vote in 1987, 10.4% in 1991 
and 15.4% in 1999. Opinion polls are predicting it will obtain 17% in the elections due 
next June. 
-  The developments that have rocked the Dutch political party system, referred to as 
"dramatic" by Hans Keman, of the Free University of Amsterdam: a strong degree of 
voter volatility that has benefited new parties, both right-wing and left-wing but 
almost all populist; the failure of the elite and the resounding success of Pim Fortuyn, 
who put forward a radical programme and managed to appear as a leader capable of 
resolving the social crisis he was denouncing; and lastly, the inability of Fortuyn's 
followers to form a real party – let alone govern – once the leader was gone. 
-  The spectacular demonstrations of disenchantment in Austria and Switzerland – two 
wealthy and socially very advanced countries –, resulting in electoral successes for 
Jörg Haider and his liberal Austrian party (FPO) in the former and for Christoph 
Blocher and his Swiss people's party (SVP) in the latter. Hans-Georg Betz, of the 
University of Geneva, linked these results to a perceptible decrease in voter turnout. 
-  Finally, the spread of Euroscepticism over the last ten years, highlighted by Bruno 
Cautrès, of the Institut d'études politiques of Grenoble. He pointed out that, following 
a marked increase in support for European integration from 1982 to 1990, in the spring 
of 1991 72% of the European population believed that their country's membership of 
the Union was a good thing, while just eight years later that percentage had fallen to 
49%. 
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PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED “SEMINARS”: 






•  Warsaw (21-22
th February, 2002): Enlargement of the European Union: towards a 
large area of solidarity and cooperation 
Available in French and English.  
 
 
•  Paris (31-1
st January, 2002): The future of the structural funds and the cohesion policy 
Available in French and German. 
 
 
•  Brussels (13
th November, 2001): Crossborder and transnational cooperation, the new 
Europe is inventing itself in its margins 
Available in French, English and Italian. 
 
 
•  Brussels (23rd May, 2001): How to enhance Economic and Social Cohesion in Europe 
after 2006?  
Available in French and English.  
 
 
•  Berlin (11-12
th April, 2001): Towards a new social contract in Europe: French and 
German social models and economic transformations.  
Available in French and German.  
 
 
•  Paris (4
th September, 2000): European Union: The reform of the Council of Ministers. 
Available in French, English and German.  
 
 
•  Brussels (2
nd November, 2000): Reuniting Europe.  
Available in French and English.  
 
 
•  Berlin (3
rd& 4
th February, 1999): The Franco-German axis: the test of Agenda 2000.  
Available in French.  
 
 
•  Madrid (27
th & 28
th November, 1998): Fifteen countries in a boat: Economic and social 
cohesion, the cornerstone of European integration.  
Available in French, English, Spanish and German.  
 
 
•  Athens (13
th & 14
th November, 1998): Europe in search of (an) identity(ies).  
Available in French, English, German and Greek.  
 
 
•  Brussels (10
th June, 1998): National Employment Pacts.  
Available in French, English, German and Italian.  
 
 
•  Luxembourg (11
th September, 1997): Industrial Relations in the European Union. 
Available in French and English.  
 
 
•  Brussels (29
 h May, 1997): Economic convergence and employment in Europe. What 
does EMU promise?  
Available in French. 